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1 Introduction 
Almost twenty years have passed since researchers from the Institute for Liberty and 
Democracy in Peru identified a key source of poor people’s decisions to work outside 
the bounds of the formal legal system: ‘bad laws’ that impose disproportionate costs on 
those who choose formality. The source of bad laws, they argue, is a redistributive 
tradition in Peru whereby economic and political organizations pressure lawmakers into 
granting favourable regulatory concessions without regard to potentially negative 
macro-societal effects (de Soto et al. 2002: 190). The resulting ‘infinity of regulations’ 
prevents informal workers from using their assets productively. 
How can we explain unsuccessful efforts to integrate informal workers into the formal 
legal system two decades later? This paper argues that while a multitude of conflicting 
regulations still precludes effective governance of informal trade in Lima, the sources of 
those conflicts are more diverse – though perhaps more tractable – than they might have 
been twenty years ago. Specifically, the paper identifies three sources of policy 
incoherence in Lima that contribute to persistent clashes between informal workers and 
policy makers: (1) the lack of definitional clarity in national and metropolitan-level 
legislation; (2) the absence of reliable mechanisms designed to resolve those 
definitional contradictions; and (3) the resulting lack of policy continuity over time 
within individual municipal administrations. These policy contradictions damage trust 
between leaders of vending organizations and local government officials, which in turn 
precludes stable and effective governance of informal trade. 
The evidence presented in this paper calls into question two alternative explanations of 
conflict between informal traders and policy makers in Lima. The first is that 
‘redistributive combines’ – the term de Soto et al. (2002 [1989]) use to refer to interest 
groups that organize for the purpose of pressuring policy makers into making laws on 
their behalf – are directly responsible for bad laws. Specifically, they identify 
organizations of street vendors, which were strong politically and organizationally in the 
mid-1980s, as the culprits of bad policy toward informal traders. However, these 
organizations – most prominently FEDEVAL, the Federation of Street Vendors of Lima 
and Callao – became extraordinarily weak in the 1990s, losing their capacity for 
effective lobbying and losing their credibility among politicians across the ideological 
spectrum. Yet bad policy persisted throughout the 1990s, long after these groups 
disappeared as relevant political actors.  
The second alternative explanation is that policy makers may simply favour the status 
quo. Street vending provides an outlet for thousands of workers who would otherwise 
be unemployed in Peru’s depressed economy, and tolerating it may provide policy 
makers with a low-cost solution to the country’s economic woes.1 Yet national, 
metropolitan, and local level policy makers have repeatedly invested time and money 
into efforts to solve the problems associated with street vending, citing an urgent need 
to bring order to the city’s chaotic and largely ungoverned streets. Were the status quo 
preferable, policy makers would not view street vending as such an urgent problem. 
Their repeated efforts to overcome these problems indicate another set of factors at 
work that contribute to the persistent conflict between street traders and local 
government officials. 
                                                 
1  Other scholars have recognized this incentive; see, for instance, Cross (1998: 4).   2
2  Defining the informal sector 
One fundamental source of conflict between street traders and local governments in 
Lima is the ambiguous place that informal workers hold in the country’s legal and 
administrative machinery. Policies that are intended to govern the use of public space 
for private commerce are based on confusing terms and conflicting definitions of 
individuals who engage in such activity.2 Workers who fall under these definitions are 
legally subject to certain rights and responsibilities, but the lack of definitional clarity 
generates conflicts when workers attempt to exercise those rights and when 
governments attempt to enforce their responsibilities. Legal and administrative 
ambiguities in policy make enforcement difficult and compliance uncommon.  
2.1 Policy  definitions 
Like academic definitions, most policy definitions include as attributes some 
combination of income, size, labour relations, and workplace to categorize these 
workers. However, major national and metropolitan level policies issued in the past two 
decades have used inconsistent labels and incomplete or conflicting definitional 
attributes. Policy definitions also fail to capture a sufficient range of conditions among 
so-called informal workers, so that many workers on the ground are excluded from the 
very types of regulations that are designed to govern them. The lack of clarity in these 
policy definitions has in turn made them relatively difficult to enforce. 
Major national and metropolitan level policies intended to govern street commerce in 
the past twenty years can be divided into three general policy periods (see Table 1). 
During the first policy period, two major laws defined the legal framework for the 
governance of street commerce: the 1984 Law of Municipalities (Law 23853), and the 
1985 Metropolitan Ordinance 002. The Law of Municipalities was the primary law 
governing the rights and responsibilities of municipal governments, and it clearly gave 
municipal governments jurisdiction over regulating and controlling street commerce.3 
The law further granted municipalities to the authority to levy certain kinds of taxes, 
which in theory could have been used to tax the occupation of public space for street 
vending. However, the law did not provide an explicit definition of street vending, nor 
did it directly link any of those taxes to the exercise of street commerce. The law 
therefore granted local governments a clear jurisdictional mandate but a vague 
administrative framework for governing street trade.4 
                                                 
2  To be sure, academic definitions of the informal sector are not much clearer than policy definitions. 
For discussions of the various academic definitions, see, among others, Peattie (1987), Carbonetto et al. 
(1988), Portes and Schauffler (1993), Portes (1994), Roberts (1994) and Cross (1998). 
3  Title III, Chapter II, Article 68, paragraph 3 (El Peruano, 9 June 1984: 26248). The Spanish term 
comercio ambulatorio is translated here as ‘street commerce’ rather than ‘ambulatory commerce’ because 
in its common usage in Peru the term refers to all types of street commerce (ambulatory and otherwise). 
All translations of policy language in this paper are my own. I use the term ‘street vendors’ and ‘street 
traders’ interchangeably throughout. 
4 I use the terms ‘municipal government’, ‘district government’, and ‘local government’ 
interchangeably in this paper. Administrative units in Peru are divided into departments, provinces, and 
municipal districts, and it is the latter that have jurisdiction over street vending. There is also an entity 
called the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima, a sort of pseudo-metropolitan government that oversees the   3
Table 1 
Policy periods, 1984-2002 
Policy period  Relevant policies  Date passed  Date published
a 
1984-1991  Law of Municipalities 
(Law No. 23853) 
28 May 1984  9 June 1984 
1991-1993 Metropolitan  Ordinance  002 
Supreme Decree 005-91 
Ministerial Resolution 022-91 
Law of Microenterprises 
(Legislative Decree 705) 
Law of Employment Promotion 
(Legislative Decree 728) 
2 April 1985 
25 January 1991 
6 February 1991 
5 November 1991 
 
8 November 1991 
17 April 1985 
26 January 1991 
7 February 1991 
8 November 1991 
 
12 November 1991 
1993-1995  Law of Municipal Taxation 
(Legislative Decree 776) 
Metropolitan Ordinance 082 
30 December 1993 
 
26 May 1995 
31 December 1993 
 
18 June 1995 
 
a Laws, Decrees, Resolutions and Metropolitan Ordinances generally go into effect one day 
after being published in the country’s official gazette, El Peruano. 
In response to the swelling ranks of street vendors in central Lima in the mid-1980s, the 
metropolitan government under Alfonso Barrantes passed Metropolitan Ordinance 002 
in April 1985. Ordinance 002 was a comprehensive measure designed to govern nearly 
all aspects of street vending in the metropolitan area. It defines street commerce as an 
‘economic activity developed in campos feriales5 or regulated areas of public space that 
provides services and/or sales of prepared, manufactured or natural products in direct 
form and on a small scale’. It then defines street vendors as ‘workers whose capital does 
not exceed two UIT (unidades impositivas tributarias)6 and who, lacking any labour 
relation with their suppliers, exercise street commerce individually in direct form and on 
a small scale’.7 Based on these two definitions, then, street vendors are those who 
(a)  work in regulated public spaces, (b) have less than two UIT of capital, (c) sell 
directly to consumers,8 and (d) vend on a small (though undefined) scale (see Table 2).  
The definitions set forth in Ordinance 002 are reasonably straightforward, and at least in 
theory provide a clear enough framework for district governments to distinguish 
between street vendors and non-street vendors in order to implement the ordinance. For 
much of the first policy period, local governments experimented with the enforcement 
of this policy, and some municipal governments were able to establish the basic 
 
                                                                                                                                               
downtown area (the district of Lima-Cercado) and that has the authority to generate ordinances that apply 
to all 43 municipal districts within the area of Metropolitan Lima. 
5  Campos feriales are a sort of fairgrounds, typically open-air markets, that are set up on government-
owned property (usually the medians of large avenues) for the specific purpose of street vending. 
6  Unidades impositivas tributarias are income units that are used to calculate taxes and fees of various 
kinds in Peru.  
7  Title I, Article 3, paragraphs (a) and (b) (El Peruano, 17 April 1985: 34118). 
8  That is, they are not wholesalers, and they are not employees of wholesalers.   4
Table 2 
Policy definitions of microbusiness workers 
Attributes 
Policy Term 
A B  C  D  E 
Ordinance 002  Street 
Vendor 












* *  *  * 
Law of 
Microenterprises 













* *  *  Internal 





* Small  * 
 
A = maximum income; B = workplace; C = labour relations; D = scale of enterprise; E = market; 
* = not specified in policy. 
administrative infrastructure to implement at least its core components.9 After the 1990 
election of Alberto Fujimori to the Peruvian presidency, however, the administration 
used its power to issue a variety of executive decrees, which added several layers of 
definitional ambiguity to the status of street vendors. These measures were largely 
efforts to implement market-oriented reforms to stabilize the economy,10 but their hasty 
formulation complicated the efforts of district governments and created a set of 
conflicting incentives that made non-compliance among vendors more likely. Such non-
compliance was pervasive during the second policy period. 
The first of these measures was Supreme Decree 005 of 1991. Supreme Decree 005 was 
most likely designed as a political appeal to street vendors, who were thought to have 
supported Fujimori in large numbers in the 1990 presidential election. The measure’s 
main stated purpose was to recognize the juridical quality of what it called ‘autonomous 
ambulatory workers’ (trabajadores autónomos ambulatorios, TAAs), though it 
provided no definition of that term.11 The decree implies that autonomous ambulatory 
workers are the same thing as street vendors by referring to a national Law of Street 
Commerce that the administration had apparently planned to pass, but such a law never 
                                                 
9 Other  municipal  governments,  however, did not. An additional problem with policy in Lima, 
emphasized later in the paper, is the frequent failure of municipal governments to implement national and 
metropolitan level policies. Some municipalities attempted to enforce Ordinance 002 only to abandon it, 
and some selectively enforced parts of it, but others simply ignored it altogether. 
10 For more on these market-oriented reforms, see Cameron and Mauceri (1997) and Gonzales de Olarte 
(1998). 
11 Supreme Decree 005 was published in El Peruano on 26 January 1991: 93570.   5
materialized. A Ministerial Resolution (No. 022) issued as a follow-up to Supreme 
Decree 005 then required ‘autonomous ambulatory workers’ to maintain a maximum 
level of working capital to be determined by each municipality, rather than the two UIT 
limit established in Ordinance 002.12  
Because the Peruvian constitution states that laws issued at a higher level of government 
take precedence over lower-level laws, it could be assumed that municipalities 
thereafter were to determine their own income ceilings for ‘autonomous ambulatory 
workers’ rather than following the limit established by Ordinance 002. Nonetheless, 
Supreme Decree 005 and Ministerial Resolution 022 provided no concrete policy 
measures for local governments to take with street vendors; they merely recognized 
vendors’ legal status. Municipal governments, lacking any clear indication of how the 
measures were to be implemented, rarely reacted to them at all. This inaction, in turn, 
tended to fuel street vendors’ claims of municipal abuse. 
Nine months after issuing Supreme Decree 005, the Fujimori administration passed two 
additional laws that would contribute to the definitional ambiguities already present. 
The first of those was the Law of Microenterprises, passed on 5 November 1991. This 
law introduced the term ‘PYMES’ – the Spanish acronym for ‘small and 
microenterprises’ – into the country’s legal lexicon. It defined PYMES as firms with 
any organizational or administrative structure that engage in any kind of productive, 
commercial, or service activity, in which (a) the proprietor is also a worker; (b) the total 
number of workers and employees does not exceed 10 persons (for a microenterprise) or 
20 persons (for a small enterprise); and (c) the total annual value of sales does not 
exceed 12 UIT (microenterprise) or 25 UIT (small enterprise). Because it does not 
specify whether PYMES must work in private space rather than public space, in theory 
any individual who qualifies as a street vendor under Ordinance 002 (or as an 
autonomous ambulatory worker under Supreme Decree 005) could also be considered a 
PYME under the Law of Microenterprises, as long as that individual did not have more 
than 20 employees – an unlikely scenario for virtually all street vendors. 
The Law of Employment Promotion, passed three days after the Law of 
Microenterprises, was a comprehensive measure designed to stimulate job creation at 
the national level. Among other things, the law called on the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Promotion to create programmes aimed at productively converting ‘informal 
sector firms’ to formal sector firms by increasing their levels of productivity and their 
capacity to create additional jobs. ‘Informal activities’ are defined as those that ‘develop 
independently in the range of small and microenterprises … and that engage mostly in 
commerce, services, small industry, construction and the manufacture of basic goods 
destined for the internal market’. The law makes reference to existing laws defining 
small and microenterprises, but adds that the boundary for maximum income levels 
should be set by the government agency CENIP, rather than municipalities. Again, this 
definition of the ‘informal sector’ could encompass street vendors, as defined by 
Ordinance 002; autonomous ambulatory workers, as labelled by Supreme Decree 005; 
and PYMES, as defined by the Law of Microenterprises.  
                                                 
12 Ministerial Resolution 022 was published in El Peruano on 7 February 1991: 94460.   6
A final policy relevant to street vendors was Metropolitan Ordinance 082, passed in 
May 1995,13 which was designed to improve the cleanliness and hygienic standards for 
firms of all types within the metropolitan area. Its definition of informal commerce is 
‘all commercial activities that take place without complying with requirements 
demanded by law’. It then states that both ambulatory commerce (street vending) and 
vending in buildings or fixed structures could be considered ‘informal commerce’, and 
contradictorily defines street vending as ‘the economic activity that takes place in public 
space, providing services in regulated areas, by selling prepared, natural, or 
manufactured goods directly to consumers on a small scale’.14 The implication is that 
‘street vending’ is at once illegal and yet authorized by municipalities, in that it takes 
place in regulated areas.  
The policies presented in Table 2 thus add up to a confusing picture of what types of 
workers are subject to what laws. While the six policies use five different terms as 
labels, all are referring to essentially the same type of worker: someone who, in one way 
or another, sells things individually on a small scale. Notably, only one of these policies 
(Ordinance 082) makes any mention of illegality in its definition, though it does so in 
confusing fashion.15 These definitional ambiguities provided a foundation for conflict 
on the ground because, as the next section will show, each law and corresponding term 
and definition for so-called informal workers implies certain rights and responsibilities 
that could not be smoothly exercised without clear definitions. 
Moreover, many workers on the ground exhibit some, but not all, of the definitional 
attributes presented in Table 2. Take a hypothetical worker, for example, who fits all of 
the characteristics of a street vendor but who does not work in an authorized, regulated 
area. If the policy definitions above were applied strictly, that worker would be 
considered a PYME (because he falls under the income ceiling and has fewer than 10 
employees) but not a street vendor (because he works on an unregulated street). This 
classification, however, would fly in the face of these policies’ intent; PYMES are 
considered ‘more formal’ than street vendors, and the motivation for passing the Law of 
Microenterprises was to stimulate the growth of PYMES, not unauthorized street 
vendors. Another hypothetical worker could vend on regulated streets but make 3 UIT 
annually; this worker would likewise qualify as a PYME but not a street vendor, even 
though she vends on a street where street vending is authorized. These conflicting 
definitions, therefore, become very difficult to enforce on the ground – first because 
they do not appropriately incorporate workers who bear some family resemblance to the 
definitions while not strictly qualifying, and second because they would require a 
Herculean effort on the part of municipal governments to decide who belongs to what 
category.  
                                                 
13 This is not to say that there are no other metropolitan-level ordinances or national-level laws that 
contain any mention of street vending. However, the six measures included in this discussion are the most 
significant ones during this period. All of these policies are cited in subsequent policy measures as 
antecedents, and informants who were interviewed for this project cited these six as the most important 
ones. 
14 Title I, Chapter III, Articles 35, 36, and 37 (El Peruano, 18 June 1995: 132478). 
15 Meanwhile, the country’s most famous study of the informal economy, The Other Path, equates 
informality with illegality.   7
2.2  Exercising rights and enforcing responsibilities 
Not only are the policy definitions discussed above inherently problematic, but the 
rights and responsibilities outlined in each measure are relatively difficult to enforce. 
Each policy theoretically entitles some group of workers to certain rights or privileges, 
and/or imposes on some group of workers certain responsibilities or restrictions. 
Ordinance 002 was the most comprehensive of these. The measure granted street 
vendors three significant privileges: legal recognition for both individual street vendors 
and properly registered associations of street vendors; participation in a Mixed 
Technical Commission (Comisión Técnica Mixta de Comercio Ambulatorio, CTMCA), 
composed of municipal officials and representatives of vending organizations, designed 
to work out problems associated with street markets at the local level; and access to a 
Vendors’ Assistance Fund (Fondo Municipal de Asistencia al Ambulante, FOMA), a 
social insurance fund intended to deliver services and benefits to licensed street 
vendors. In effect, these three concessions to street vendors represented a major political 
and legal advance on vendors’ behalf, as they required municipalities not only to 
recognize and tolerate the existence of street vending, but also to negotiate with vendors 
through the CTMCA and deliver services to them through the FOMA. 
In return, Ordinance 002 outlined a host of responsibilities and requirements for street 
vendors to meet. These requirements included obtaining a license (and paying an 
associated fee for that license); acquiring a health certificate; paying a daily tribute, 
called the sisa, for the right to use public space; obtaining special authorization for 
vending certain kinds of products (e.g. live animals and prepared food); maintaining 
their posts at a certain size and in a certain colour; wearing officially sanctioned 
uniforms; providing proof of origin for their merchandise; and vending only in 
authorized spaces. Sanctions for non-compliance were to be determined and enforced by 
the CTMCA of each district, which municipalities were required to establish in 
conjunction with leaders of vending organizations.16  
Again, Ordinance 002 outlines in relatively coherent and comprehensive fashion a set of 
rights and responsibilities that should in theory be enforceable. However, several 
obstacles to its enforcement arose over the years. First, the capacity of municipal 
governments tended to fall short of that necessary to identify, classify, and authorize all 
individuals who sold merchandise in public spaces within district territory, particularly 
given the hazy definitional framework established in relevant laws. Without an adequate 
administrative infrastructure to issue and deny authorizations to all those entering, 
exiting, or maintaining street vending as an occupation, the remainder of the rights and 
responsibilities became difficult to enforce. Not only could vendors who did not meet 
all the definitional criteria for street vendors in Ordinance 002 claim to not be subject to 
its restrictions, but those charged with non-compliance could easily move to another 
part of the district, or to another district altogether, to avoid sanctions.  
In turn, many municipal administrations simply ignored the requirement to form the 
CTMCA and FOMA. This non-compliance with the ordinance on the part of municipal 
governments themselves infuriated vendors, who in turn sometimes refused to comply 
                                                 
16 Organizations of street vendors were quite strong during this period, calling into question the 
conventional wisdom that so-called informal workers lack the capacity to organize (see, e.g., Jenkins and 
Leicht 1997).   8
with the ordinance’s restrictions on the basis that the government was not holding up its 
end of the bargain. In particular, vendors had a good case for refusing to conform to 
sanctions for non-compliance that were not developed with the participation of the 
CTMCA. Likewise, municipal governments in some cases charged vendors for 
licensing fees and the sisa without delivering any services in return, on the basis that 
vendors did not comply with all of the restrictions outlined in the ordinance.  
Subsequent measures added fuel to the fire of non-compliance. The rhetorical appeal of 
Supreme Decree 005 and Ministerial Resolution 022 to the legal and human status of 
street vendors emboldened them to resist municipal efforts to expel them from 
unauthorized spaces. Furthermore, by prohibiting the confiscation of merchandise and 
personal property from vendors found in non-compliance with municipal regulations, 
the decree took away an important incentive for vendors to comply, at least in theory. 
At the same time, that protection of vendors’ merchandise was only applicable to 
authorized vendors, so that local officials in some cases could simply revoke 
authorizations for certain vendors and then confiscate their merchandise anyway.  
The Law of Microenterprises and the Law of Employment Promotion further 
complicated the picture by granting PYMES and informal sector workers access to state 
programmes, again at least in theory. The former called on appropriate government 
ministries to provide entrepreneurial training and legal assistance free of charge to all 
those who qualified as PYMES – which, as stated above, could be interpreted to include 
street vendors. In addition, it prohibited municipal governments from requiring 
operating licenses or authorizations other than a particular kind of license established by 
national law, and required PYMES to keep accurate books. Without a clear demarcation 
of what constituted PYMES versus street vendors, however, this law left the door open 
for disputes over the applicability of each provision. Moreover, by implying that street 
vendors could be considered PYMES, it provided an incentive for vendors to remain 
informal, rather than encouraging them to formalize. The Law of Employment 
Promotion likewise grants informal sector firms access to administrative amnesties; 
entrepreneurial, technical, and professional training; and credit and funding 
programmes. These measures were designed to provide incentives for informal sector 
firms to convert themselves into formal sector firms, but again leaves room for disputes 
by providing hazy definitions of informal sector firms, autonomous workers, and small 
and microenterprises. 
The difficulty of adequately enforcing the various provisions of these policies created 
strong incentives for local governments to selectively implement only those portions of 
the policies that were (a) feasible and (b) advantageous. While municipal governments 
are undoubtedly handicapped by their meager budgets,17 they also hold some coercive 
power over street vendors, and can therefore often get away with such selective 
enforcement. Street vendors, perceiving injustice, in turn become all the more likely to 
avoid complying with regulations, particularly when the likelihood of gaining 
concessions in return seems low. Moreover, any given street vendor faces a bewildering 
array of incentives that often contradict one another because of the definitional 
ambiguities present in policy measures. The result is a difficult cycle of non-
enforcement and non-compliance that has perpetuated itself over time. 
                                                 
17 See Nickson (1995).   9
3  Pursuing a resolution: INDECOPI and the tax on public space 
In principle, the country’s legal system should provide some mechanisms for resolving 
these struggles over ambiguous policies. Indeed, in November 1992 the Fujimori 
administration created the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and 
Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI), to help adjudicate such disputes over 
commerce-related policies. The institution was designed to ‘promote a culture of fair 
and honest competition in the Peruvian economy and to protect the different forms of 
intellectual property’,18 and one of its responsibilities was to rule on charges brought 
against state actors for interfering with free competition. In 1994 an enterprising group 
of street vendors attempted to resolve perhaps the most contentious issue for street 
vendors, the habit of municipal governments to levy a daily tax (the sisa) on their use of 
public space, by filing a case with INDECOPI. Though the vendors succeeded in getting 
INDECOPI to rule favourably on their case, in practice the resolution had little effect.  
The dispute over local governments’ right to tax street vendors for their use of public 
space stemmed from contradictions between the 1984 Law of Municipalities, Ordinance 
002 of 1985, and a 1993 Law of Municipal Taxation. The Law of Municipalities 
authorizes local governments to administer five different kinds of tributes:19 taxes 
(impuestos), tolls (contribuciones), user fees (arbitrios), licenses (licencias), and 
entitlements (derechos) (see Table 3). The first three – taxes (established by national 
law to finance municipal budgets), tolls (on benefits derived from public works projects, 
such as roads, bridges, and ferry crossings), and user fees (for public services such as 
street lighting, trash pickup, and park maintenance) – are fairly clearly inapplicable to 
street traders in their capacity as workers. That is, while they may be subject to paying 
taxes, tolls and user fees as members of the general public, they cannot be charged with 
paying them on the basis of their work as street vendors. 
Table 3 
Municipal taxes 
Law of municipalities  Applicable to vendors  Purpose 
Taxes (impuestos), tolls 
(contribuciones), user fees 
(arbitrios) 
No  Contributors are taxpayers at large 
or users of municipal services or 
infrastructure 
Licenses (licensias)  Yes  Fees paid in exchange for specific 
authorizations, e.g. use of public 
space 
Entitlements (derechos)  Unclear  Fees paid in exchange for specific 
administrative services 
Law of Municipal Taxation 
Property, real estate, 
automobiles, events, gaming, 
and non-sports-related public 
events 
No  Contributors are property owners or 
participants in specific activities 
Valuations (tasas)  Unclear  Fees paid in exchange for specific 
administrative services 
                                                 
18 Decreto Ley 25868, Ley de Organización y Funciones del Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la 
Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual, published in El Peruano 24 November 1992. 
19 I use the term ‘tribute’ here as an umbrella term to refer to various kinds of monetary contributions 
from citizens to municipal governments, of which ‘taxes’ are one kind.   10
The fourth kind of tribute, a fee paid in exchange for a license, is charged for obtaining 
authorization for specific activities that should be regulated and controlled, for reasons 
of public interest. The law clearly states that municipalities can charge licensing fees in 
exchange for the occupation of public space. It also states that the administration of 
licenses for the use of public space in municipalities is subject to regulations established 
by the government of Metropolitan Lima. Thus, municipal governments should be able 
to charge street vendors for a license to use public space, as long as they do so in 
comformity with metropolitan-level ordinances – most importantly, Ordinance 002. 
The fifth kind of tax, labelled here ‘entitlements’, is somewhat more ambiguous. The 
law states that municipalities may charge entitlement fees, or derechos, ‘in exchange for 
an administrative service that the Municipality provides for the use or exploitation of 
public or municipal goods’. The law further states that the amount to be charged for 
entitlements is to take into account the cost of the service provided. Street traders 
clearly use public space, and if public space is to be considered a public good, then 
municipalities could in theory charge vendors for this use. At the same time, the intent 
of the law is fairly unambiguously to generate the funds necessary to cover the 
administrative costs of allowing citizens to use a public good. Therefore, if a municipal 
government were to provide a service associated with the use of public space for street 
vending – for example, providing infrastructure for street markets, or helping administer 
the vendors’ social assistance fund – then the law would seem to permit charging street 
traders for this entitlement. By contrast, if the municipality does not administer any 
services associated with the use of public space, then it would seem that charging the 
entitlement fee would be inappropriate. 
Indeed, Metropolitan Ordinance 002 a year later explicitly labelled the sisa – a daily 
payment for the right to occupy public space – an entitlement fee, implying that it was 
to be charged in exchange for some service. The ordinance further states that 50 per cent 
of the revenue generated through the collection of the sisa was to be used to fund 
programmes developed through the FOMA, the social assistance fund earmarked 
specifically for street vendors.20 It does not state explicitly whether the other 50 per cent 
of sisa revenues is to be deposited in the municipal treasury, or whether it too should be 
used for services related to street vending. Nonetheless, it is clear from the ordinance 
that municipalities are required to use at least half of sisa revenues to fund the FOMA. 
Yet many local governments that have charged the sisa since 1985 have done nothing 
more than collect the fee and issue a small slip of paper in return that authorizes the 
bearer to vend in public space for that day. 
The Law of Municipal Taxation, passed in December 1993,21 dramatically changed the 
regime governing municipal taxation. This decree, which went into effect on 1 January 
1994, redefined municipal governments’ ability to levy taxes and nullified the articles of 
the Law of Municipalities that established the five kinds of taxes described above. In 
their place, Legislative Decree 776 authorized six distinct types of taxes, none of which 
                                                 
20 In fact, the ordinance states that the FOMA should be funded with the revenue from the entitlements 
outlined in a previous article – that is, from both the sisa and the municipal license. In practice, however, 
municipal governments that have implemented the FOMA have generally funded it with 50 per cent of 
the sisa funds only.  
21 Decreto Legislativo 776, Ley de Tributación Municipal (published in El Peruano, 31 December 1993: 
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seemed to have any applicability to street trading.22 However, the law separately 
authorized the use of tolls and what it called tasas, or valuations, as fees charged by 
municipalities to fund public and administrative services. According to the law, 
municipalities may charge tasas for the private use of municipal property; operating 
licenses for industrial, commercial, or service establishments; parking; and ‘other 
licenses’ for anyone who engages in an activity subject to municipal control or 
oversight, as defined in the Law of Municipalities. The decree further states that tasas 
charged for the use of municipal property should not exceed the cost of administering 
the service that allows citizens to use that property, and that income generated through a 
tasa should be used exclusively to cover those administrative costs.23 Finally, the law 
states that operating licenses must remain valid for a period of at least one year, and that 
license renewals should be automatic as long as (a) the zoning ordinances that allow for 
the operation do not change, and (b) the person requesting the operating license submits 
proof that they paid income tax. 
Having eliminated municipal governments’ ability to levy entitlement fees such as the 
sisa, the Law of Municipal Taxation seemed to grant them the ability to establish a fee 
that would serve the same purpose as the sisa through the establishment of tasas. 
However, the law also contained several mechanisms designed to eliminate barriers to 
free trade within the country, part of the Fujimori administration’s broader market-
oriented reform strategy. For example, Article 61 stated that municipalities would be 
prohibited from charging tasas for the use of streets, bridges and other infrastructure, 
and that they could not levy fees that would ‘impede free access to markets and free 
commercialization within national territory’. This article therefore created an important 
ambiguity with regard to street vendors. On the one hand, municipal governments 
seemed to have the authority to charge fees for annual operating licenses, which could 
be applicable to street vendors. On the other hand, the law seemed to imply that 
municipal governments did not have the authority to charge a tasa for the daily use of 
public space, as they had with the sisa.  
Without the authorization to charge the sisa, it became unclear whether municipal 
governments were still obligated to enforce the parts of Ordinance 002 that relied on the 
income the sisa was supposed to generate, most importantly the FOMA. At the same 
time, many municipal governments continued to charge vendors the sisa even after the 
Law of Municipal Taxation revoked their authority to do so. The sisa thus became a 
central source of conflict between vendors and municipal governments; vendors argued 
that they should not have to pay it if the municipality failed to deliver any services in 
return, and municipal governments argued that vendors should have to pay it regardless 
for their use of public space. 
Faced with the inconsistent application of Ordinance 002 and the Law of Municipal 
Taxation, the United Front of Informal Workers of the District of Pueblo Libre 
(FEDITAPUL) presented to INDECOPI on 23 August 1994 a denunciation against the 
City Council of Pueblo Libre24 for violating Legislative Decree 776.25 The authors of 
                                                 
22 These were taxes on property, real estate transactions, automobiles, events, gaming, and non-sports-
related public events. 
23 Title III, Chapter II, Articles 68, 69 and 70. 
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the denunciation argued that charging the sisa and establishing a costly fee for a health 
certificate violated the principles of free and open competition, as established in the 
Law of Municipal Taxation. INDECOPI, which had not previously ruled on either issue, 
accepted the case. 
The resolution issued by INDECOPI seemed to deliver a victory to street vendors by 
declaring the sisa illegal. The resolution stated that the collection of the sisa in the 
district in question took place without any sort of service delivery on the part of the 
municipality, which violated the Law of Municipal Taxation’s definition of tasas. 
INDECOPI further ruled that restrictions on the freedom to market products outlined in 
the Law of Municipal Taxation could apply to either formal and informal commerce, 
and that creating bureaucratic restrictions and charging people to exercise rights (in this 
case, the constitutional right to work) constituted clear violations of that provision. 
Although the Law of Municipalities does give municipal governments the power to 
regulate areas in which street commerce exists, INDECOPI argued, ‘at no point does it 
signal that this power includes the right to levy charges of any kind’. Finally, though the 
same Law of Municipalities grants municipal governments the authority to impose tasas 
in certain cases, in no case can they create such charges without the express legal 
authorization to do so.  
In theory, the INDECOPI resolution should have brought to an end the practice of 
charging the sisa for the right to use public space. In practice, it did not. Although 
INDECOPI’s rulings are distributed to the relevant national-level institutions for 
enforcement, the municipal practice of charging street vendors the daily sisa continued 
in many jurisdictions after 1995.26 Lacking a resolution, a coalition of leaders of street 
vending associations attempted a second route to new legislation in 1998 by developing 
a draft Law of Street Commerce and submitting it to the national Congress. Though a 
similar effort in 1994 had failed,27 the 1998 draft legislation called for the formation of 
a new national-level agency, comprised of representatives from various government 
ministries, municipalities, and vending associations, to rationalize the country’s 
treatment of street vendors.28 Like previous laws, it contained measures that would 
clarify municipal governments’ authority to govern street vendors and mechanisms to 
bring street vendors under the aegis of national institutions, most notably the tax and 
social security systems. However, like the 1994 measure, the bill did not make it far 
enough into the legislative process to be voted on by the full congress. 
4  Applying policy at the local level: the case of La Victoria 
The ambiguities in policy described above, and the absence of a reliable way to resolve 
them, have created the foundation for extremely unstable policy at the local level in 
Lima. The following discussion explores policy instability in one district, La Victoria, 
                                                                                                                                               
25 The information presented here is based on INDECOPI Case File No. 121-94/CLC. 
26 INDECOPI Resolution No. 027-95 was passed on 26 July 1995. 
27 Proyecto de Ley 1985/94-CCD. The draft bill’s declaration of new street vending legislation as a 
national priority had the support of the Ministry of the Presidency, MITINCI, the metropolitan 
government of Lima, and the Chambers of Commerce, but lacked enough political support in the 
Congress to get passed. 
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over the course of three administrations (1992-2002). La Victoria is a large, poor, 
centrally located district that houses the city’s largest wholesale and retail markets, 
along with its dynamic garment district, Gamarra. As such, it has a densely concentrated 
commercial area with thousands of street vendors and microentrepreneurs. While it is 
not representative of all districts in Lima, its policy problems are emblematic of other 
large, centrally located districts.29 
In the ten years beginning in 1992, the municipal government of La Victoria passed no 
fewer than 74 new policies related to street vending (see Appendix 1).30 The sheer 
volume of regulations attempting to govern street trade is not only impressive, it also 
suggests that policy makers’ first preference is not simple negligence or maintenance of 
the status quo. Yet many of these regulations are not published, making their diffusion 
difficult in practice. Those that are published in El Peruano sometimes are not 
published until up to a year after they are passed. Moreover, street vendors’ low 
socioeconomic status means that very few of them are likely to purchase and read the 
country’s official gazette to check for new regulations; rather, they are dependent on 
leaders of vending organizations to present and explain the content of new policies. 
These difficulties are exacerbated when new policies are issued on average once every 
six to eight weeks. It is not surprising, then, that many street vendors do not adapt their 
behaviour to the frequently changing rules of the game. 
The policies listed in Appendix 1 exhibit two other characteristics that help explain 
problems with enforcement and compliance at the street level. First, many of these 
policies are quite particularistic and ad hoc. Examples of particularistic policies include 
measures that declare street vending illegal on individual streets; grant legal recognition 
to individual associations of street vendors; establish rules only for vendors of certain 
products; and call for the eradication or relocation of a single kiosk, stand or stall, 
oftentimes in response to a complaint from a resident or shopkeeper. Thus, they are not 
regulations designed to impose order on the sector as a whole; rather, they are intended 
to respond to individual problems as they arise.  
This hotchpotch of particularistic policies has a couple of important consequences. On 
the one hand, vendors who are negatively affected by these policies – for instance, a 
policy prohibiting them to vend in front of a particular house or store – can simply move 
to another street, creating the same problem in a different place. While they may be 
merely shifting the same problem to another location, in doing so these vendors are 
paradoxically in full compliance with the policy that caused them to leave. 
On the other hand, some of these policies grant important benefits to individual vendors 
or associations of vendors. For example, Ordinance 050 of July 2000 grants special 
                                                 
29 For more on Gamarra, see Ponce Monteza (1994) and Sulmont Haak (1999). 
30 The actual number of policies passed during this period is undoubtedly higher. Appendix 1 shows the 
results of a search for policies conducted during fieldwork in 2001 and 2002; for the sake of presentation, 
some of the less relevant policies were omitted. Informants (including leaders of street vending 
organizations and municipal officials) were asked to identify policies related to street vending during each 
of the three administrations, and once identified, a search for the text of each policy was undertaken. 
However, some municipal policies are never published in El Peruano, and the municipality does not keep 
complete records of the policies it passes. Without such an archive it was impossible to determine the 
exact number of policies issued during this time period. I am confident, however, that the most important 
policies of that time period are included in the Appendix.   14
authorizations to shoe shiners and vendors of quinoa, sodas and candy, herbal drinks, 
and magazines and newspapers. Leaders of vending associations in each of these 
product categories considered the ordinance an important political victory, and as a 
result distanced themselves from other associations in the district that did not enjoy the 
same privileges. This policy therefore had a divisive effect on vendors who otherwise 
would share a common interest in beneficial legislation for the whole district. 
While the absence of a coherent legal framework is not the only cause of this 
improvisational approach to policy, it is undoubtedly an important contributor. With 
clearer definitions and rules, municipal governments would be more capable of applying 
any single ordinance uniformly across district territory and across different groups of 
vendors. Without such policy clarity, many local governments make policy reactively, 
acting only when pushed in a manner that solves individualized problems but not the 
broader source of those problems. 
A second subset of policies from Appendix 1 is dedicated to the difficult struggle of 
enforcing Ordinance 002 of 1985. The rise and fall of the ordinance’s implementation 
over time illustrates the type of controversy that results from ambiguous policy 
antecedents. Although this ordinance had never been fully implemented in the eight 
years since it was issued, the government of La Victoria under Mayor Carlos Camaaño 
signed a pact in August 1993 with the three major street vending federations in the 
district – FEDITAV, CUTASPA, and FEBAINVIC – agreeing to establish the FOMA. 
Mayoral decree 092-93, issued on 10 September 1993, officially authorized the 
establishment of the FOMA for the district of La Victoria, to be funded with revenues 
from the sisa.31 In line with the broad goals outlined in Ordinance 002, the objective of 
La Victoria’s FOMA was to provide social assistance, channeled through the 
municipality via a governing board made up of city and vendor federation 
representatives, to street vendors in exchange for their payment of the sisa.  
Representatives of the street vending federations who served as the first directors of the 
newly constituted FOMA chose health care as their first priority area for delivering 
social services to street vendors. Using sisa revenues, the directors rented a building on 
a street near central Gamarra and in it established a small-scale health clinic that was to 
provide basic medical services for vendors who paid the tax. Among other activities for 
the FOMA in 1994 and 1995 were assisting the municipality with trash collection, 
conducting a census of street vendors in the district (which estimated the vendor 
population to be over 11,000), developing a new licensing programme for vendors, 
establishing a legal consultancy, and running cleaning campaigns and social activities.  
Energized by the municipality’s long-awaited implementation of Ordinance 002, street 
vendors involved in the FOMA appeared to have established the basis for an enduring 
                                                 
31 A previous mayoral decree from June 1993 indicates that a CTM in the district already existed. The 
latter decree, No. 023-93-ALC, identifies new members of the commission from both sides. However, the 
pact signed by MDLV and the vending federations on 18 August indicates that the CTM had not been 
meeting regularly, in that the pact calls for ‘the immediate re-initiation of meetings of the CTM in a 
serious and formal manner’. The pact also indicates that the municipality had been charging the sisa, but 
using a private firm to collect it from the vendors each day, a practice to which the vendors objected. The 
absence of comprehensive records in the municipality makes it difficult to ascertain whether the FOMA 
had also existed prior to Caamaño’s tenure as mayor. The records available do indicate that the official 
authorization of street vending associations in the district had been regular practice since a 1986 city 
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and  cooperative  relationship  with  the  new  mayor.  However,  the  implementation  of 
Ordinance 002 in La Victoria ultimately created more problems than it solved. Though 
vendors initially agreed to it, the collection of the sisa as a daily fee for the right to use 
public space for private commercial gain developed into a central component of the 
controversy.  
The sisa generated a significant amount of income for the district government. A 1993 
municipal record of income for the month of December, for example, shows that the 
sisa contributed over 38,000 nuevos soles to the municipal treasury that month (about 
US$18,000) – a considerable sum for a poorly funded district government. Control over 
the funds became hotly contested between vendors and the municipality, neither of 
which had a solid financial base otherwise.32 The mayor’s first approach to collecting 
the  sisa was to authorize, through a mayoral resolution, the contracting of four 
individuals to collect the daily fee from street vendors in authorized areas of the district. 
Each individual was to earn a commission of up to 1 per cent of the amount of sisa 
revenue they collected from vendors each week.33 A subsequent mayoral resolution 
added 54 more collectors, and changed the commission to 20 per cent of sisa funds 
collected each month or 15-day period. 
Although no records are available to indicate how effectively this system functioned on 
the ground, two of its characteristics are notable. First, the development of commissions 
as a percentage of funds collected obviously creates an incentive for collectors to 
expand the number of vendors from whom they collect, which could lead to competition 
between individual collectors over certain geographic areas of the district.34 Second, 
without knowing how many vendors there were in the district and where they were 
located, the city would have no way to ensure that collectors were delivering the full 
amount that they collected to the municipal treasury. Therefore, the system created a 
strong incentive for collectors to skim profits off of the amount they collected before 
delivering the revenue to the city and collecting their commissions.35 
Three months after authorizing these individuals as collectors, a new mayoral decree 
shifted responsibility for the administration of the sisa to the directors of the FOMA.36 
The decree’s language suggested that part of the mayor’s motivation was to expand the 
opportunities  for  street  vendors  themselves  to  participate  in  the  process,  and  a 
subsequent resolution indicated that the FOMA directors had demanded the ability to 
fire any collector who did not carry out his or her duties faithfully. Like the previous 
system, however, this one did not last long. Within four months, the city council called 
an ad hoc meeting to discuss the behaviour of the FOMA directors with regard to sisa 
                                                 
32 Municipal governments in Peru historically have had one of the weakest financial structures of any 
country in Latin America (Nickson 1995: 237-249). 
33 Notably, the one woman among the collectors was given a commission 30 per cent lower than the 
commission for the male collectors. 
34 For example, an area with a high density of street vendors would produce more income in a smaller 
amount of time than an area where vendors are fewer in number or more dispersed. 
35 This is not to suggest that the collectors necessarily took advantage of these incentives; there is no 
evidence available to evaluate them one way or the other. However, in a district as poor as La Victoria, 
the incentives for cheating are extremely strong. 
36 This may suggest that vendors complained about the control that individual collectors named by the 
municipality had over the funds that were supposed to be destined for the FOMA.    16
collection. On 9 August 1994, the city council passed an accord stating that the FOMA 
directors  had  not  delivered  a  single  budgetary  report  to  the  municipality,  and  as  a 
consequence the officers of the municipal treasury had no way of overseeing the delivery 
of  sisa  funds.  The  council  therefore  approved  another  shift  in  responsibility  for  the 
administration of the sisa, this time from the FOMA directors to the municipal Accounts 
Receivable office. Another accord passed on the same day called for the creation of an 
Evaluation Commission to investigate the FOMA’s management of sisa funds. 
The future of the FOMA appeared to be safe in December 1994, a little over a year after 
it was created, despite the controversies over the sisa revenue. Mayor Caamaño 
approved a set of new regulations for the FOMA in December, which not only 
authorized the FOMA’s continued operation but also expanded some of its areas of 
responsibility. However, a mayoral decree issued on 15 March 1995 suspended the sisa 
on the basis that residents were complaining about overcrowding on sidewalks, and that 
the municipality had a responsibility to establish order and security in the district. 
Meanwhile, vendors likewise accused the municipality with malfeasance; the country’s 
leading newspaper, El Comercio, ran an article quoting a leader of one of the vending 
organizations that the municipality had failed to transfer any resources collected through 
the sisa to the FOMA.37  
Subsequent policy measures called for the creation of a new commission to investigate 
the FOMA and an external audit of the FOMA’s use of sisa funds. The audit, conducted 
by a private firm later that year, revealed further discrepancies with the management of 
FOMA funds. The district’s Control Office issued a letter dated 4 October 1995 to the 
FOMA Vice President that the Department of Revenue had not received any deposits of 
sisa funds since January of that year. The same office established an investigative 
commission to evaluate in greater depth the use of sisa funds on the part of 
FOMA directors, leading to a series of requests for documentation and an inventory 
of FOMA property, along with an increase in the level of suspicion and mistrust 
between FOMA directors and other bureaucrats within the municipal government. 
Another measure called for the replacement of the sisa with a new tasa to be charged 
for vendors’ use of public space. This last measure, passed in August 1996, partially 
brought the municipality’s tax regime in line with the 1993 Law of Municipal Taxation, 
which had negated the municipal right to charge the sisa (though the Municipality of La 
Victoria went on charging it for roughly two years anyway). Finally, a city council 
resolution passed in December 1996 recommended disbanding the FOMA, and 
thereafter the municipality’s daily charge for the use of public space was not 
reciprocated by the delivery of any services.  
The difficulty in implementing Ordinance 002 in La Victoria is emblematic of the 
broader problems with public policy toward street vendors in Lima. The ordinance 
attempts to establish comprehensive guidelines that should in theory benefit both street 
vendors and local officials by stabilizing and normalizing the relationship between the 
two sides. Yet in practice the ordinance became unenforceable in La Victoria for a host 
of reasons. First, the ordinance relied on the effective collection of the sisa to fund 
services for street vendors; without the proper administration of sisa funds, the 
ordinance could not work. Yet attempts by both municipal officials and vendor leaders 
                                                 
37 ‘Ambulantes consideran que pago de ‘sisa’ les da derecho a trabajar en la vía pública’, El Comercio 
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to administer those funds resulted almost immediately in controversy. Second, the 
municipal government lacked the capacity to effectively monitor a very fluid population 
of workers. To enforce the ordinance to the letter, district governments would have to 
develop a thorough and accurate registry of vendors, keep unlicensed vendors out of 
unauthorized areas, adequately distinguish between complying and non-complying 
vendors, and punish the latter effectively. The municipality of La Victoria was at no 
point able to accomplish those goals. Third, the Law of Municipal Taxation’s abolition 
of the sisa left Ordinance 002 without a financial base, which caused controversy once 
the municipality decided to comply with that Law. 
Perhaps most fundamentally, the particular actors involved could not iron out the details 
of implementing the policy in order to make it work. While in principle none of these 
controversies had to derail the effort to implement Ordinance 002, the policy left a great 
deal of negotiation and improvisation up to the actors involved. Once it became clear 
that the ordinance in its entirety would not be adequately enforced, actors on both sides 
had little incentive to faithfully adhere to the rules. With policy ambiguities so 
pervasive, the incentives for defection were simply too strong to resist. The general lack 
of compliance on both sides quickly soured the relationship between vendor leaders and 
local officials, and as the next section will show, this lack of trust still plagues relations 
between vendors and the government at a more general level. 
5  Policy incoherence and the path to formalization 
Without a stable and coherent regulatory framework, street traders and government 
officials in Lima exhibit a tremendous amount of mistrust toward one another. Both 
leaders of vending organizations and policy makers interviewed for this project view the 
other side as intransigent antagonists, and neither side is willing to believe that the other 
will faithfully hold up its end of any bargain. Street traders’ mistrust of politicians and 
political parties further suggests that they are unlikely to resolve their problems through 
political means. Yet interestingly, this mistrust does not seem to translate into an 
unwillingness to formalize. When asked what they understood by ‘formalization’ in a 
2003 survey,38 most vendors equated formalization with owning or renting an off-street 
commercial space, and most said that they thought they would be better off formalizing 
than they would remaining in the street. These results suggest that converting informal 
traders into more formal business enterprises may not be an altogether intractable goal. 
One of the most prevalent complaints among leaders of street vending organizations is 
what they call the ‘constant improvisation’ on the part of local government officials, as 
was the case with implementing Ordinance 002 in La Victoria. For some, the frustration 
comes from the unequal treatment of different groups of vendors. ‘Ordinance 002 
recognized us, gave us a voice’, explained one leader in an interview, ‘but until now the 
authorities haven’t treated us all equally. If they had treated us all the same, the entire 
sector would be better off’. Others argued that the government’s inability to apply 
                                                 
38 The survey was directed by the author and implemented by a team of 13 local interviewers and a field 
coordinator in June 2003. The team interviewed a total of 454 street vendors and microentrepreneurs at 
three research sites in Lima: the Caquetá commercial conglomerate in the district of San Martín de Porres; 
the Polvos Azules commercial center in downtown Lima; and Gamarra, the garment district located in the 
district of La Victoria. The sample was drawn from an original sampling frame constructed by 
enumerating vending posts in the 10 days prior to the commencement of interviews.   18
sanctions evenly across different groups of vendors means that some get away with 
cheating the system, for example by vending adulterated or stolen goods at lower prices. 
Others identified the instability of policy over time as their biggest frustration with 
government officials. ‘They tell us one thing one day, and something totally different 
the next’, complained one, ‘It gives us the attitude of “I know you’re going to deceive 
me, so I’m going to deceive you first”. They cannot be trusted’. 
This unwillingness to trust the authorities also appears in the attitudes and behaviour of 
street traders in general. Vendors interviewed in the 2003 survey exhibited tremendous 
skepticism about both politicians and political parties. Sixty-five per cent agreed with 
the statement that ‘politicians decide whatever they want and there is nothing I can do to 
influence them’, and 76 per cent agreed that ‘politicians don’t care what people like me 
think’. This level of skepticism was also evident in their responses to questions about 
problem-solving behaviour. While 36 per cent reported that they had participated in 
protests or demonstrations in the past five years to express their demands, less than two 
per cent said that they had attempted to contact party officials. Finally, more than 55 per 
cent said they either detest politics or do not have any interest in politics. These results 
suggest a substantial disjuncture between street traders and the formal political system. 
Yet this disjuncture does not mean that street traders’ first preference is to avoid 
formalization. Curiously, street vendors exhibit much more agreement over what 
‘formalization’ means than policy makers or academics do over what the ‘informal 
sector’ means. Table 4 shows that the most common understanding of formalization 
among street traders is the acquisition of an off-street locale, either rented or owned, 
from which to sell their merchandise. Other common meanings of formalization 
included having a license or being registered with the authorities; having some savings; 
having a tax identification number; belonging to an organization or being unified with 
others who also engage in street vending; and being safe from expulsions. Interestingly, 
more than a third of the vendors interviewed (37 per cent) had attempted their own 
formalization efforts. Perhaps most strikingly, 85 per cent reported that they thought 
they would be better off formalizing than they would remaining in the street. 
Table 4 
Meanings of ‘formalization’ to street vendors 
Meaning  Per cent of total mentions 
Owning an off-street locale  45 
Renting an off-street locale  18 
Having a license or municipal authorization  12 
Having savings  9 
Having a tax identification number  6 
Being a member of an organization  3 
Being safe from police expulsions  2 
Having access to credit  1 
Having lower costs of doing business  1 
Getting help from the municipality  1 
Having social security  1 
Having a greater investment in merchandise  1 
 
Source: 2003 Microbusiness Survey. The first five alternatives were response categories included in the 
wording of the question, and the remainder were volunteered by respondents. The question allowed for 
multiple responses.   19
6 Conclusion 
The evidence presented here suggests that although the problem of ‘bad laws’ still 
plagues the informal sector in Peru, its sources are perhaps more tractable than they 
were twenty years ago, when rent-seeking pressure groups were much stronger. Existing 
laws governing street commerce use conflicting and ambiguous definitions that do not 
adequately capture the range of conditions found on Lima’s streets. These ambiguities 
in turn produce a dizzying array of conflicting incentives for those who may seek to 
formalize their work. They also provide the groundwork for a host of conflicts once 
actors attempt to implement these policies on the ground; without an adequate legal 
foundation, actors on both sides can argue indefinitely about who should have to 
comply with what law. Municipal governments’ ad hoc efforts to respond to these 
conflicts reduce trust between government officials and leaders of vending 
organizations, which in turn produces a tremendous amount of cynicism and apathy 
toward the formal political system among street traders. These conditions suggest a 
difficult cycle of non-enforcement and non-compliance. 
At the same time, however, the vast majority of street traders express a willingness to 
formalize. Moreover, previous efforts of street vending associations to improve their 
working conditions suggest that the potential for building strong organizations capable 
of negotiating stable accords with local authorities remains promising. Certainly the 
problem of bad laws is partially rooted in the country’s history of pervasive corruption 
and rent-seeking behaviour, but the problem of harnessing the entrepreneurial potential 
of informal workers for the sake of economic development remains urgent enough to 
warrant a more serious consideration of specific institutional sources of policy 
incoherence. More coherent policy could reduce the incentives for remaining informal. 
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Appendix 1: 
Street vending policies in La Victoria, 1992-2000 
Policy Number  Date  Summary 
A.C. 001-92-CM  3/2/92  Prohibits vending on certain streets 
R.A. 1307-92-ALC  8/25/92  Negates pact with vending associations on three streets; calls for 
vendors’ immediate eradication 
D.A. 015-93-ALC  5/10/93  Prohibits vending on certain streets 
Edicto 001-93  5/20/93  Creates new tax to fund security force 
R.A. 0253-93-ALC  5/25/93  Calls for relocation of one kiosk 
D.A. 023-93-ALC  6/4/93  Calls for restructuring of CTMCA 
Ord. 005-93-LV  6/8/93  Prohibits vending on certain streets 
A.C.020-93  8/9/93  Prohibits sale of certain foods on streets of La Victoria 
R.A. 1060-93-ALC  8/25/93  Recognizes individual vending association 
D.A. 092-93-ALC  9/10/93  Establishes FOMA and sisa 
D.A. 093-93-ALC  9/10/93  Sets contribution levels for sisa; restricts size of posts 
D.A. 102-93-ALC  9/28/93  Establishes sisa for kiosks 
Ord. 009-93-LV  10/12/93 Authorizes sale of food in tents 
R.A. 1238-93-ALC  11/9/93  Names sisa collectors and establishes commissions 
R.A. 1239-93-ALC  *  Names new sisa collectors and changes commissions 
R.A. 1459-93-ALC  *  Recognizes individual vending association 
 *  *  Names new sisa collectors and changes commissions 
R.A. 0041-94-ALC  1/13/94  Calls for immediate eradication of 4 kiosks 
D.A. 004-94-ALC  2/9/94  Shifts responsibility for collecting sisa to FOMA 
 *  6/10/94  Approves new regulations for FOMA; negates D.A. 092-93 
A.C. 020-94  8/9/94  Suspends payment of salaries to FOMA members 
A.C. 021-94  8/9/94  Shifts responsibility for collecting sisa to Municipal Treasury 
A.C. 022-94  8/9/94  Calls on FOMA representatives to return paid salary 
A.C. 023-94  8/9/94  Establishes Evaluation Commission to investigate FOMA 
R.A. 2205-94-ALC  8/15/94  Calls for immediate eradication of vendors at one location 
R.A. 1663-94-ALC  10/6/94  Authorizes one company to install kiosks around district 
D.A. 0033-94-ALC  12/7/94  Raises level of sisa contributions and reduces commissions 
D.A. 0045-94-ALC  12/23/94 Authorizes FOMA to enact cleaning campaign 
D.A. 0046-94-ALC  12/23/94 Calls for reordering of street commerce by eradicating vendors 
without current licenses 
D.A. 0047-94-ALC  12/26/94 Approves new regulations for FOMA 
D.A. 0048-94-ALC  12/26/94 Approves new regulations for CTMCA 
 *  *  Calls on CTMCA to conduct registration campaign 
R.A. 0274-95-ALC  2/28/95  Recognizes representatives of one vending federation 
R.A. 0275-95-ALC  2/28/95  Recognizes representatives of one vending federation 
D.A. 0020-95-ALC  3/15/95  Suspends payment of sisa   22
Policy Number  Date  Summary 
D.A. 0046-95-ALC  5/22/95  Prohibits vending near Parque Canepa; authorizes only vendors 
deemed indispensable to district 
R.A. 0427-95-ALC  7/31/95  Calls for immediate eradication of various kiosk and cart owners 
R.A. 1737-95-ALC  8/28/95  Calls for expulsion of vendors occupying storefront garden 
A.C. 006-96  1/19/96  Establishes new Commission to investigate FOMA and CTMCA 
A.C. 029-96  5/9/96  Calls for new regulations of FOMA and external audit; shifts 
responsibility for collecting sisa to complete muni. control 
A.C. 034-96  5/20/96  Calls on CTMCA to develop new vending regulations 
A.C. 045-96  5/22/96  Rejects complaint filed by vendors regarding A.C. 029 
Ord. 001-96  8/22/96  Creates new tasa to be charged to vendors; negates sisa 
A.C. 065-96  8/22/96  Approves new regulations for street vending throughout district 
Ord. 003-96-MDLV  8/22/96  Outlines new regulations for street vending 
R.A. 0904-96-MDLV  11/15/96 Outlines administrative reorganization of municipal government 
Edicto 001-96  12/23/96 Establishes new organizational structure of municipality 
A.C. 106-96  12/31/96 Recommends disbanding FOMA in light of elimination of sisa 
D.A. 033  4/16/97  Creates special municipal commission to devise new strategy for 
formalizing vendors 
D.A. 048  6/18/97  Prohibits vending on certain streets 
A.C.039-97 6/23/97  Prohibits  vending on certain streets 
D.A. 004-97-ALC  10/2/97  Declares beginning of new project to reorder Jiron Gamarra, 
including expulsion of street vendors 
Ord. 002-99-MDLV  1/6/99  Redefines municipal tax regime; negates all previous tasas 
Ord. 004-99-MDLV  1/6/99  Establishes framework for funding security force; duties include 
collection of daily payment from street vendors 
Ord. 005-99-MDLV  1/6/99  Redefines time frame for charging operating licenses 
Ord. 014-99-MDLV  1/28/99  Approves new regulations for issuing operating licenses 
Ord. 015-99-MDLV  1/28/99  ‘Formalizes’ street commerce in the district 
Edicto 001-99-MDLV  1/28/99  Creates new municipal office to oversee street vending issues 
A.C. 016-99-MDLV  3/19/99  Declares urgent situation in area of wholesale and retail markets 
Ord. 018-99-MDLV  3/19/99  Establishes tax incentive for vendors who formalize 
Ord. 028-99-MDLV  7/23/99  Establishes sanctions and fees for various acts of non-compliance
Ord. 033-99-MDLV  10/15/99 Establishes rules for applying above sanctions 
Ord. 035-99-MDLV  11/23/99 Names special zone around wholesale and retail markets; prohibits 
occupation of public space in that zone 
R.A. 0578-00-ALC  6/21/00  Authorizes vendors on sidewalks around one commercial center 
Ord. 047-00-MDLV  6/22/00  Approves new comprehensive regulations for area around 
wholesale and retail markets 
Ord. 045-00-MDLV  6/22/00  Approves formal legal text for above regulations 
Ord. 050-00-MDLV  7/14/00  Grants special authorization to vendors of certain products 
Ord. 054-00-MDLV  11/30/00 Approves new regulations for authorized vendors 
 
*In some cases only drafts of policies missing policy numbers and dates were available. 